

The India Controlled Kashmir Uprising in 1989 and U.S.-Pak Relation

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Abstract

The Kashmir issue was the result of British colonial rule in South Asia Subcontinent. In the division between India and Pakistan, the political future of Kashmir and other Indian Princely States did not stipulate clear by the British India government. This led to both the India and the Pakistan could have its own excuses to hold the Kashmir Princely State. Pakistan and India had two and half wars about the belonging to the Kashmir Princely State. Despite the international community made great efforts to mediate the Kashmir issue, but the Kashmir issue did not get much progress. Due to the long existing of the Kashmir issue, India and Pakistan were in the long running tensions. So, America could not maintain good relations with both Pakistan and India at the same time. America formed an alliance with Pakistan eventually led to the rapid development of the Indo-Soviet relationship. And America provided military aid to India led Pakistan to change its diplomatic policy. As a result, U.S.-Pak relation was damaged greatly. Therefore, the Kashmir issue was a long-term negative factor which eroded the U.S.-Pak relation. And the impact of the India Controlled Kashmir Uprising in 1989 for the U.S.-Pak relation was very typical. This article would analyze this typical case, study how the India Controlled Kashmir Uprising in 1989 made a negative impact on the U.S.-Pak relation, and thus to understand how the Kashmir issue made a negative impact on the U.S.-Pak relation.

Key words: U.S.; Pakistan; Kashmir; The India controlled Kashmir uprising in 1989

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INTRODUCTION

The Kashmir issue was the result of British colonial rule in South Asia Subcontinent. In the division between India and Pakistan, the political future of Kashmir and other Indian Princely States did not stipulate clear by the British India government. This led to both the India and the Pakistan could have its own excuses to hold the Kashmir Princely State. Pakistan and India had two and half wars about the belonging to the Kashmir Princely State. The first Indo-Pak war established the partition reality of the Kashmir, Pakistan and India both occupied part of the Kashmir. India occupied about 60% of Kashmir territory and 75% of Kashmir population, while Pakistan occupied 40% of Kashmir territory and 25% of Kashmir population. Despite the international community made great efforts to mediate the Kashmir issue, but the Kashmir issue did not get much progress. Because of the Kashmir issue long-term unsolved, thus triggered the second Indo-Pak war. The second Indo-Pak war did not substantially change the Kashmir territorial possession situation of India and Pakistan. The third Indo-Pak war was caused by the East Pakistan, but India launched the war based on a strong motivation that hoping to change the status quo of Kashmir, so the third Indo-Pak war could be viewed as a half war for Kashmir. Although the third Indo-Pak war ended with Indian victory and Pakistani failure, but the Kashmir territorial possession situation of India and Pakistan had not substantially changed, Kashmir issue still could not solve. Due to the long existing of the Kashmir issue, India and Pakistan were in the long running tensions. So, America could not maintain good relations with both Pakistan and India at the same time. America formed an alliance with Pakistan eventually led to the rapid development of the Indo-Soviet relationship. And America provided military aid to India led Pakistan to change its diplomatic policy. As a result, U.S.-Pak relation was damaged greatly. Therefore, the Kashmir issue was a long-term negative factor which eroded the U.S.-Pak relation. In 1989, the Indian occupied Kashmir broke out a great uprising. Pakistan had provided assistance to the insurgents. America worried about India and Pakistan broke out another war because of the Kashmir issue, so issued warnings to Pakistan so that Pakistan could stop its support for Kashmiri insurgents. Pakistan overtly agreed but covertly opposed to the American warnings, and continued to support the Kashmiri insurgents. Therefore U.S.-Pak relation was very tense. The India Controlled Kashmir Uprising in 1989 caused what negative effects on the U.S.-Pak relation still need more in-depth study.

1. THE INDIA CONTROLLED KASHMIR UPRISING IN 1989 AND PAKISTAN SECRET INTERVENTION

In 1982, after the death of Sheikh Mohamed Abdullah who was the most famous Kashmir Muslim leader, the India central government had interfered in political development of India Controlled Kashmir. This made the India Controlled Kashmir Muslim youth felt very worry in mind. Most of the India Controlled Kashmir Muslim youth who were alienate to the India central government, they chose a peaceful way to express their discontentment to India rule. In 1987, the India central government openly manipulated the election of the India Controlled Kashmir Pradesh assembly. After this dirty election, the India Controlled Kashmir Muslim youth began to use more violent protest measures. This led to the India Controlled Kashmir Uprising in 1989, made the India Controlled Kashmir under the trample of war, and resulted in the Indo-Pak relation was very tense in the whole 1990's (Sumit, 1997, pp.80-102).

On December 8, 1989, some members of the main opposition group, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front had kidnapped daughter of Indian Interior Minister Mufti Mohamed Said, and forced India central government to release 5 captured Muslim militants. Mufti Mohamed Said was a Muslim from the India Controlled Kashmir. After this kidnapping case, the India Controlled Kashmir immediately happened uprisings in the whole India Controlled Kashmir range (Cheng, 2007, p.126). Under the blow of a series of wars, the India Controlled Kashmir government had in fact fallen apart. India central government announced the implementation of the president management in the India Controlled Kashmir. Because of the India Controlled Kashmir uprising became more violent, the counterattack of India army to the insurgents was even crueler. The iron hand policy of India central government not only failed to stabilize the situation in the Indian Controlled Kashmir, but also made the insurgents became more radical.

Although the Indian Controlled Kashmir uprising was not launched by Pakistan, but because of the Muslim religion emotion and geopolitical reality consideration, Pakistan was very hard to refuse to help the Indian Controlled Kashmir uprising. Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence began to provide positive support to the Muslim insurgents in the Indian Controlled Kashmir. The first aim of Pakistan helping the Indian Controlled Kashmir insurgents was to support the Indian Controlled Kashmir people to implement self-determination, because this was the long term core target of Pakistani Foreign Policy. In addition, Pakistan also viewed helping the Indian Controlled Kashmir insurgents as a very convenient means, in retaliation for India in 1971 to support and involvement of the East Pakistan independence movement and the invasion of East Pakistan, and eventually led to the dismemberment of Pakistan (Kux, 2001, p.305).

Due to the serious frustration brought by inability to stabilize the India Controlled Kashmir situation and repress the India Controlled Kashmir uprising, India central government aggressively to strengthen its army in the Indian Controlled Kashmir. India had also accused the mess of the India Controlled Kashmir was outside incitement results, while the Pakistan beard unshirkable responsibility. India called the India Controlled Kashmir uprising as proxy war of Pakistan, transboundary terrorist activities, accused the organizers behind the curtain were Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence, claimed the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence armed the India Controlled Kashmir Muslim youths , and then sent them back into the India Controlled Kashmir to do anti India government activities. India had accused Pakistani move was intended mainly to undermine the stability of India, so that India suffered serious consumption in the economy, contained Indian large amount of forces in the military, thus weakening the Indian will on the Kashmir issue to make the Kashmir issue internationalization, at last got a solution which was propitious to Pakistan (Chengg, 2007, pp.134-135). Pakistani Foreign Secretary Zaki pointed out: The Indian army in the Indian Controlled Kashmir harshly repressed on the spontaneous uprising of the local people caused tensions of South Asia situation (Zaki, 1992, p. 9).

Because India continued to strengthen its regular army and paramilitary forces in the Indian Controlled Kashmir, along the previously relatively calm line of actual control in Kashmir, India and Pakistan had occurred more frequent and severe heavy artillery and mortar fire. In early 1990, because India deployed a large number of troops in the Indian Controlled Kashmir, and Pakistan immediately carried out corresponding military deployment, caused tensions between India and Pakistan increased sharply. Indian Prime Minister V. P. Singh issued a threat of War to Pakistan in public: “Unless we reach our purpose, otherwise we will never stop. We have the ability to make Pakistan pay unusually heavy price for its activities against India.” (Farzana, 1992, p. 48) On March 13, 1990, Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto came to Pakistan Controlled Kashmir for inspection. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto declared in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir: Pakistan is willing to fight a millennium war for supporting the Indian Controlled Kashmir insurgents. On April 10, 1990, Indian Prime Minister V. P. Singh demanded in public speech that India people should prepare psychologically for war, and warned Pakistan, don't expect obtain the Kashmir not through war (Cheng, 2007, p.136). India and Pakistan leaders' declaration full of gunpowder smell, thus made the tension between India and Pakistan increased further.

2. AMERICA FEARED OF INDO-PAK WAR RECURRING

U.S. felt very worried about the confrontation between India and Pakistan caused by the India controlled Kashmir uprising. Both U.S. ambassador to India William Clark

and U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley believed that India and Pakistan were very likely to outbreak armed conflict. So the two Ambassadors were very worried about the deteriorating confrontation between India and Pakistan. America Deputy Secretary of state Kimmitt warned India and Pakistan: The possibility of misjudge between India and Pakistan was increased, this would make the situation in South Asia like a plane which was come into dangerous spin state, soon would lose control and crash the land (Al Kamen, 1990, April 21). U.S. was very uneasy about that if India and Pakistan broke out another war. India and Pakistan are very likely to use nuclear weapons in this Indo-Pak war. Although after the Indian “Smiling Buddha” nuclear test in 1974, India did not explode any nuclear device again, but U.S. specialists believed that after the 1974 nuclear test, among these 15 years, India already had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. And U.S. specialists also believed that although Pakistan had never conducted any nuclear test, but Pakistan nuclear program already had reached a very high level; so that Pakistan could quickly finish the last step of assemble nuclear devices (Kux, 2001, pp.305-306). At this time, U.S. had obtained information that Pakistan had ordered to assemble a nuclear weapon (Cheng, 2007, p. 136).

U.S. wanted to prevent India and Pakistan broke out in a conventional war again, or even triggered a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, so began to mediate the dispute between India and Pakistan. In 1990 May, President Bush sent Deputy National Security Council assistant Robert Gates as envoy to South Asia to conduct preventive diplomacy in India and Pakistan (Goshko, 1990, May 16). Robert Gates arrived in South Asia, had repeatedly warned Pakistan and India leaders do not to use military force, and suggested that the India and Pakistan adopted a series of measures for the establishment of mutual trust, in order to reduce the risk of armed conflict between Pakistan and India. Robert Gates met with Pakistani leaders in Islamabad, he emphasized the view America believed in that India would thoroughly defeat Pakistan in any kind of the military conflict. Robert Gates also expressed American worries on Pakistani active support for the insurgents in India Controlled Kashmir. Robert Gates warned Pakistan in a hawkish tone, America viewed Pakistani active support for the insurgents in India Controlled Kashmir as very dangerous behavior. Pakistani officials firmly denied the charges that Pakistan was supporting the insurgents in India Controlled Kashmir. Pakistan called the uprising in India Controlled Kashmir as Kashmir people fight for freedom, and called the insurgents as freedom fighters. Pakistan made it clear that would give the political, moral and diplomatic support to the insurgents in India Controlled Kashmir, but denied providing any personnel, equipment or capital assistance to the insurgents in India Controlled Kashmir (Cheng, 2007, p.135).

But Robert Gates did not believe in the denial of Pakistan. After the strong involvement and positive persuasion of America envoy Robert Gates, the possibility of war between Pakistan and India had been greatly reduced. India and Pakistan

had agreed to take some confidence building measures. For example, such as the establishment of hotline between India and the Pakistan leaders, and send advance notice to the other for the information of mobilize its army. The Robert Gates delegation got much warmer welcome in India than in Pakistan. This is rapidly cooling signal of U.S.-Pak relation. Because the President Ishak Khan was very rigid, so when he talked with Robert Gates, he demonstrated his formality. And when the army chief of staff general Aslam Begg talked with Robert Gates, he from time to time said some words with accusations and confrontation (Kux, 2001, p.306). Pakistani indifference attitude to Robert Gates was not only because of Robert Gates had warned the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence may not support the insurgents in India controlled Kashmir, the key point was American efforts of stabilizing the South Asia situation were more conducive to India who was occupied the advantage position in the Kashmir territorial situation, and more unfavorable to Pakistan who was occupied the inferior position in the Kashmir territorial situation. Pakistan tried to push the Kashmir realizes self-determination by made use of the mess in the India controlled Kashmir. But this thought was suppressed by the American efforts of stabilizing the South Asia situation. So Pakistan was very dissatisfied to America. This dissatisfaction emotion made the welcome to Robert Gates was a more lukewarm state.

3. U.S. WARNED PAKISTAN TO STOP SUPPORTING THE INSURGENTS

Soon after the ambassador of Pakistan to American abida Hussein came to Washington for the new post, Deputy Secretary of state for Political Affairs, Arnold Kanter issued a warning to Pakistan: If Pakistan continues to support Kashmiri insurgents secretly, Pakistan will bear the very serious risk that American would declare publicly Pakistan is the state sponsor to terrorism. Deputy Secretary of state Arnold Kanter bluntly pointed out: "If Pakistan bears such blow on the basis of the Pressler Amendment that would completely end the U.S.-Pak relation." (Kux, 2001, p.316) The warning of Deputy Secretary of state Arnold Kanter to Pakistan was based on the reliable reports made by intelligence. These report believed that, Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence was continued to provide direct aid to anti Indian insurgents in India controlled Kashmir. In some cases, Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence provided training and supplies to anti Indian insurgents in India controlled Kashmir, then helped them went through the line of actual control of India and Pakistan in Kashmir and permeated into India controlled Kashmir engaged in military activities. In other cases, Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence organized Jihad veterans took part in the anti India uprising in India controlled Kashmir. These Jihad veterans had participated in the Afghan anti Soviet resistance movement.

As for Nicholas Platt, who became the American ambassador to Pakistan at the end of 1991, with all the problems which was need to resolve, except the nuclear issue, terrorism problem was the most urgent one need to deal with. Ambassador Nicholas Platt pointed out: “When I met every level officials of Pakistan, I will always put forward the issue of terrorism, from the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the lower officials, there are no exceptions.” At the beginning, Pakistan officials deny that Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence was involved the support for terrorism, and had claimed that perhaps some secret organizations and some secret persons did these things, but we did not do these things. Pakistan government had responded that Pakistan only provided political and moral support to the insurgents in India controlled Kashmir. But later, Pakistan officials admitted that Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence once provided some practical help to the insurgents in India controlled Kashmir, but also claimed that this help now had been stopped. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence had two kinds of different views on how to deal with the U.S. pressure. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that, if do not follow the stern warning of America, Pakistan would face very serious consequences. But Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence tended to continue to provide direct help to the insurgents in India controlled Kashmir, and expressed the doubt to the U.S. determination of really includes Pakistan in the state sponsor of terrorism. At last, Prime Minister Sharif accepted the view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prime Minister Sharif held the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence very firmly, did not allow the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence active support the insurgents in India controlled Kashmir, to prevent America really include Pakistan in the state sponsor of terrorism (Kux, 2001, p.316).

Prime Minister Sharif understood that if U.S.-Pak relation continues to worse, Pakistan could not get any benefits. Because America was the victor of the cold war, and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, U.S. became the only superpower in this world. At the same time, Indo-Pak relation was rupture seriously because of Pakistan had supported the India Controlled Kashmir Uprising in 1989, and the Afghanistan future continued to be uncertain, worried leadership of Pakistan were eager to repair U.S.-Pak relation (Gargan, 1992, February 19). In order to prevent more negative impact on U.S.-Pak relation, Prime Minister Sharif was willing to take the risk to dissatisfy domestic pro-Islamic groups, stop a demonstration which wants to go across the line of actual control of India and Pakistan in Kashmir. This demonstration was launched and controlled by Islamic armed groups who supported the anti Indian insurgents in India controlled Kashmir (Gargan, 1992, March 31).

CONCLUSION

In the history of U.S.-Pak relation, U.S. viewed the international factor in the global level as the most important factor, while Pakistan viewed the area factor

in South Asia level as the most important factor. Since the foundation of Pakistan, it had a huge territory dispute on Kashmir with its eastern neighbor India. This territorial dispute was the heritage of British colonial rule. Because of the existence of Kashmir issue, India and Pakistan had two and half wars. Although the United Nations actively mediated between India and Pakistan for the Kashmir issue, but still did not solve the Kashmir issue. The existence of the Kashmir issue made the Sino-Pak relation was very uneasy. America could not maintain good relations with both Pakistan and India at the same time. The U.S.-Pak relation was disturbed by the U.S.-Indo relation. The Pakistani strength was weaker than the Indian strength, and Pakistan want to defend its national security, so Pakistan actively engaged in nuclear development. Although America always put pressure on Pakistan to make Pakistan abandoned its nuclear development. However, Pakistan wanted to safeguard its national interests, did not willing to yield to American pressure. This led to the U.S.-Pak relation suffered serious damage. In this process, the influence of the India Controlled Kashmir Uprising in 1989 for U.S.-Pak relation was very typical. Through the analysis of this typical case, we could find out that how the Kashmir issue made a negative impact on the U.S.-Pak relation. Despite the India Controlled Kashmir Uprising in 1989 did not let India and Pakistan officially entered the war, nor did not made a serious blow to the U.S.-Pak relation. But 10 years later, in 1999 India and Pakistan again had a serious local armed conflict on the Kashmir issue. This conflict was Cargill conflict. This armed conflict could be regarded as a half war on the Kashmir issue. America attached great importance to Cargill conflict, and actively controlled this crisis. American believed that the fault of Cargill conflict was mainly in the Pakistan side, thus strengthening the pressure on Prime Minister Sharif, forcing Prime Minister Sharif made concessions to end this conflict. Although Cargill conflict finally ended, but Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif soon was overthrew by a military coup because its concession to Cargill conflict, therefore U.S.-Pak relation also suffered serious damage. Although after Cargill conflict, India and Pakistan did not break out a large-scale armed conflict again, but the shelling around the line of actual control in Kashmir still did not terminate, the impact on the U.S.-Pak relation was continued to exist. In fact, the possibility of India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue in the short term was very little, therefore the Kashmir issue would continue to influence the development of U.S.-Pak relation in the foreseeable future, and very likely still is a negative factor.

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